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ABSTRACT
Our Nation has adopted integrated unmanned ground, air and maritime systems into nearly every facet of
conventional and irregular warfare. Today‟s warfighters are dependent on the Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance (ISR) and Communications provided by unmanned systems from the strategic level down to the
tactical edge. Demand for these systems is quickly outpacing our capacity and despite the game changing
capabilities provided by these systems, there are still gaps in our ability to utilize them in denied access areas, to
rapidly deploy / task them to new and changing areas of interest, and provide cost effective, ubiquitous ISR and
communications coverage.
Agile, reliable and cost effective nanosatellite/microsatellite constellations, integrated into the military services‟
unmanned systems roadmaps, could fill their ISR and communications capability gaps, augment their existing
architectures and enable Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) exploitation of information for the tactical edge (i.e.,
conventional, clandestine and special operations forces).
Northrop Grumman is pursuing and conducting technology demonstrations to validate the concept of
nanosatellite/microsatellite constellations providing actionable intelligence to the lowest tactical level and exploring
innovative architectures enabling dynamically retaskable unmanned ground, air and space assets to ground units at
or below the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) level. Soldiers could soon have unprecedented access to relevant, realtime ISR and communications regardless of geography, borders, weather or enemy tactics.
“The last six years have proven, without a doubt that
unmanned systems operating in the air, on land, and in
maritime domains have significantly contributed to
accomplishing the Departments‟ missions.” FY20092034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap , Office
of Secretary of Defense. 3

INTRODUCTION
In 2000, DOD had fewer than 50 unmanned aircraft in
its inventory; within a decade, this number had grown
to more than 6,800. The introduction, proliferation and
subsequent demand for Unmanned Systems (UMS)
fundamentally changed U.S. manned and, more
recently, space strategies. Increasingly, traditional
manned and/or space missions, such as ISR and C3 are
transitioning to UMS missions. This fact has been
recognized by the Services, OSD, Congress and
industry.

In under a decade UMS‟s have fundamentally changed
the way we conduct warfare. Demand for these systems
is quickly outpacing our capacity. Additionally, despite
the unprecedented capabilities these systems provide,
there are still gaps in their ability to operate in the
presence of environmental and/or deliberate adversarial
actions, operate in bandwidth constrained environments
or to provide cost-effective, theater-wide persistent
coverage.

“Ongoing operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have
dramatically accelerated UAS usage …. The majority
of surveillance is already being conducted by
unmanned platforms and will continue to increase…”
U.S Army Roadmap for UAS 2010-20351

SMALL SAT EMERGENCE

“Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and the effects they
provide have emerged as one of the most „in demand‟
capabilities the USAF provides the Joint Force” United
States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight
Plan 2009 – 20472
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Currently there are fewer than 50 Nano/Micro Satellites
(small sats) in the DOD inventory. What will this
industry look like in a decade? The trends are clear.
Fueled by the explosion in consumer applications such
as smartphones and tablet computers, electronics
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existing and future manned and unmanned ISR
architectures.

continue to decrease in size and power while increasing
in capability. The cubesat community is exploiting
these advances and drawing in thousands of participants
around the globe, not just industry but universities and
amateurs also, each bringing a new way of looking at
old problems. The small sizes of payload components
are driving spacecraft designers to rethink other
spacecraft technologies. The standardization of the
cubesat form factor is one such example and innovative
composite bus structures are another. Budget pressures
are forcing decision makers to look for opportunities to
get good-enough performance at much lower cost. And
finally we are seeing emerging opportunities for lower
cost launch, through rideshares such as the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Secondary
Payload Adaptor (ESPA) or innovative, small, low cost
launcher proposals.

MILITARY APPLICATIONS
There are countless military applications both current
and emerging that could benefit from small sats. Two
of the most urgent and prolific are disadvantaged user
support beyond line of sight and Anti Access Area
Denial operations.
BLOS Disadvantaged User Support
“In the rugged and remote terrain of Afghanistan, small
unit dismounted operations, inserted and extracted by
Air Assault and far from the support of combat vehicles
are the norm, not the exception.
We lack the
dismounted Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) Situational
Awareness (SA) capability for soldiers …..”
Operational Needs Statements (ONS) for 101 st ABN
DIV (AASLT), Situational Awareness capability for
Dismounted and Mounted Soldiers4

All of these forces pushing towards smaller size and
lower cost change the mission design equation radically
away from the paradigms that have ruled the space
industry for decades. Nano and micro satellites are
cheap enough that they can be built to inventory and
launched on demand to respond to an immediate crisis,
whether military or humanitarian, or as gap fillers.
Being low cost, even when you include launch costs,
they can be viewed as consumables, comparable to
expending a few cruise missiles. This, by the way,
removes the pressure to build in extreme reliability
which triggers the vicious circle of cost increase. If the
satellite or launch fails, it‟s cheaper just to launch
another one. Low cost also changes the rationale for
command and control of space assets, making it
economically feasible for satellites to be “owned”
directly by the warfighter in theater, and not having to
compete with other users for access to the resource.
Low cost and size also means that large proliferated
constellations are practical. Constellations as large as
50 or more can be deployed for well under the price of
national systems. This can provide global reach,
persistence or very short latencies. A constellation in
storage on the ground or in orbit would be a very cost
effective insurance policy to protect against loss of
national capabilities. And again, because of the low
cost, the constellation could be continuously
replenished with more advanced designs as the
technology and operational experience mature. Small
size adds a further benefit of survivability. The
satellites are more difficult to detect and their
replacement cost will likely be lower than the cost to an
adversary of destroying them.

UAS currently conduct BLOS communications relay in
support of dismounted, disadvantaged users like the
Special Operating Forces (SOF). However, due to
bandwidth, coverage, signature and access limitations
many disadvantaged users may never get access to
reliable, persistent BLOS comms at the tactical edge.
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is
tasked with conducting unconventional warfare, foreign
internal defense, special reconnaissance and direct
actions in support of U.S. national policy objectives. At
any given time USSOCOM may have as many as 5,000
soldiers and civilians deployed around the world in
more than 50 countries and that number is projected to
double in size by 2017.
Demand for Special Operations Forces (SOF) has
roughly quadrupled since 9-11 and is expected to
continue growing along with the global war on terror.
As demand for special operators rise and mission
complexity increases, deployed SOF teams will
increasingly operate in uncertain, inaccessible lawless
areas with insufficient theater-based military or civil
communications assets and networks. Our ability to
support these forces with UMS communications and
ISR is often contingent on complicated international
over flight regulations, local logistical support and
survivability limitations.
Affordable and agile small sat constellations equipped
with software defined radios could soon provide
SOCOM and other disadvantaged units with networked
architectures providing global secure communications
access and greatly extend communications windows
and data rates for passing and tracking time-critical

All of these trends suggest that small sats are at a
tipping point where they will begin to fill current UMS
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) and
communications capability gaps, as well as augment
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information and fleeting targets. Small sat
constellations will enable a disadvantaged unit in the
field, under dynamic conditions, to reach out/up/back
anytime conditions warrant and provide cost effective,
persistent two-way secure communications regardless
of geography, political borders, weather or enemy
tactics.

Small sat constellations, either launched on demand or
established prior to an event, could provide adequate
reconnaissance and C2 gap fillers to mitigate the risks
in A2AD environments.
Small sats would be
survivable in even the most contested air-space,
weather would have little effect on them and political
boundaries do not yet reach low earth orbit.
Additionally, the small sat low signature form factor
and low cost make for both a very difficult kinetic/ nonkinetic target and a system-of-systems that can costeffectively provide graceful degradation and high
redundancy through on-orbit spares.

Anti-Access Area- Denial
“Prospective adversaries are developing and fielding, or
have ready access to, military capabilities that will
place US forces operating from large, fixed forward
bases, and in the littoral regions, at increasing risk.
Consequently, the Pentagon faces new challenges to the
operations of air and land forces from overseas bases,
as well as how best to structure its maritime forces to
operate in the littoral.” Meeting the Anti-Access and
Area-Denial Challenge 5

INTEGRATED ARCHITECTURES
The U.S Army Roadmap for UAS 2010-20351
describes the concept of manned-unmanned teaming as
combining “the inherent strengths of manned platforms
with the strengths of UAS, which produce synergy not
seen in single platforms.” It goes on to say, “properly
designed, Manned Unmanned (MUM) teaming extends
sensor coverage in time and space, and provides
additional capability to acquire and engage targets.”

Put another way, Andrew Krepinevich, a West Pointeducated officer and former senior Pentagon strategist
describes one of China‟s Anti-Access Area-Denial
(A2AD) strategies as a powerful combination of
traditional but sophisticated air defenses, ballistic and
anti-ship missiles, and similar weapons to put at risk
nearby U.S. forces and regional bases, together with
anti-satellite and cyberwar weapons to disable U.S.
reconnaissance and command-and-control (C2)
networks.

With the emergence of small satellites, we see a similar
evolution in which space capabilities will be teamed
with UAS to produce new synergies. Perhaps more
than any other service, the Army has the most to gain
from space-unmanned teaming. Air-space integration
could directly impact many of the Army‟s key UAS
strategy areas such as manpower and commonality.

UAS typically avoid anti-air threats in contested
airspace and most often operate from regional bases.
Commanders must provide direct support by other
systems to employ tactics such as Suppression of
Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), or Information Ops (IO)
to mitigate this operational UAS risk. These tactics
may not be suitable if the commander is conducting
peace time operations, providing SA of ongoing
adversary exercises, looking for indications of hostile
intent, or simply does not have the required in-theater
capabilities to execute SEAD missions.

Manpower
Soldiers are the backbone of the Army‟s UAS strategy
and manpower has always been a key factor for the
Army. The Army can purchase more systems; it cannot
purchase more soldiers. Air-Space integration could
reduce the logistics footprint required to support
combat troops in theater. Soldiers who previously
focused on flying and maintaining UAS‟s will be free
to focus on the mission‟s combat objectives. Required
personnel for UAS force protection, maintenance and
operators could be taken out of theater and/or
reassigned.

The increasingly congested, contested and competitive
space domain is revealing risks to our space based
reconnaissance and command-and-control (C2)
networks. Proliferation of anti-satellite ASAT weapons
and sophisticated jamming systems endanger our ability
reliably task National Technical Means in A2AD
theaters.

Commonality
Another key area for the Army is commonality. The
Army uses a “commonality” and an “open architecture
systems” approach as the two fundamental foundations
of the UAS strategy. Integrated Process Exploit
Disseminate (PED) architectures for UAS‟s have been
slow to emerge and continue to evolve. Integration of
disparate assets has been a challenge and the
introduction of satellites to that architecture will be a
similar challenge that needs to be addressed. Common
ground stations that seamlessly integrate small sat

In addition to kinetic threats, other A2AD issues
include political borders and environmental conditions
such as precipitation, high winds or sand storms that
may degrade or even periodically eliminate the
employment of both manned and unmanned air assets.

Kuhnert

3

25th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

ISR and communications being supplied by small sats.
Small sats will ensure a soldier‟s ability to instantly
push as well as pull time-critical information both
vertically and horizontally in any terrain and across any
border.

space, air and ground ISR could reduce the training
required to operate multiple ground station types.
Soldiers can be trained once and employed anywhere
regardless of the ISR architectures supporting the
mission.
Ground
commanders
could
access
constellations, dynamically requesting mission specific
ISR and communications via common ground control
stations. Constellations of small sats, UAS and UGS
could work seamlessly together to provide ground
commanders persistent, ubiquitous theater/AOI
communications and ISR coverage. To the warfighter
on the ground, the source of his ISR data or the path
taken by his communications would be transparent.
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Challenges
Small sat architectures will not be without challenges as
they proliferate into existing and future architectures.
Scheduling and adjudication of tasking requests as
satellites transition across AORs and possibly between
theaters will present special challenges. Integrating the
data links used by satellites, which may include direct
in-theater downlink or remote ground stations or even
store and forward to CONUS, with the existing
architecture for UAS will be another technological
challenge. Another equally complex issue will be
centrally managing the health and operational
configuration of satellites while reconciling the need to
make the system responsive to a distributed set of users,
each wanting to have a virtually dedicated asset.
CONCLUSION
“Inefficiencies are created by duplicative activities
carried out for similar functions. The rapid pace of
technology change, coupled with the demands of
seeking ways to use technology to save both Warfighter
and noncombatant lives as soon as possible and the
non-robust
coordination
across
current
activities/domains has caused some duplication of
functions across the domains. This has often kept
stakeholders unaware of other‟s efforts, thus creating
some duplication.” FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems
Integrated Roadmap3
Small sats will change the way services develop,
organize, and employ UMS across the full spectrum of
operations and will need to be considered when
developing the next generation unmanned systems
strategy. They will face challenges along the way but
as the technological and architectural milestones are
met we will see a robust small sat presence in future
missions.
Small sats will augment or replace
insufficient
theater-based
military
or
civil
communications assets and networks and, as nation
states advance their own UAS and counter-UAS
capabilities, the services will rely more heavily on the
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